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COMMENT
Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting Recovery to
Compensation for Loss, Not Chance
Enhanced risk of disease claims involve allegations of harm from a
disease not yet contracted and not certain to occur. The recurring fact pat-
terns in enhanced risk cases approach, sadly, the realm of archetype: toxic
substances leaching into drinking water wells;1 insulation workers breathing
asbestos-laden air;2 shipyard employees being drenched by toxic chemi-
cals;3 a family discovering radioactive waste on its land;4 a pregnant wo-
man taking a prescribed drug later linked to birth abnormalities.5 Enhanced
risk claims appear in myriad causes of action,6 including medical malprac-
tice,7 nuisance,8 strict products liability,9 strict liability for ultrahazardous
activity, 10 and negligent infliction of emotional distress." At times, the
cause of action remains unnamed.' 2
1. E.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 291 (NJ. 1987).
2. E.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1984), modi-
fied, 752 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1985).
3. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., 788 F.2d 315,317 (5th Cir.), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th
Cir. 1986).
4. Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D. Colo. 1984).
5. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. M11. 978).
6. In rare cases, plaintiffs claim damages for enhanced risk of disease in contract suits. See
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). In Transamerica, plain-
tiffs claimed an increased risk of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) as a result of
exposure to HIV-infected blood as they gave emergency assistance to an automobile accident
victim. Id. at 291-92. The court rejected plaintiffs' allegation that this constituted "bodily injury"
within the meaning of an insurance policy. Id. at 291.
Recently, a party to a divorce proceeding raised a claim for enhanced risk of AIDS. In re
R.E.G., 571 N.E.2d 298,301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the use
of enhanced risk of AIDS as a factor in the trial court's distribution of property. Id. at 304.
7. E.g., Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 408 (NJ. 1984) (alleging failure to detect breast
cancer); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1958) (alleging enhanced risk of cancer
due to radiation bums sustained during therapy); Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d
383, 384-85 (Wis. 1974) (conceding negligence when pieces of broken catheter remained in plain-
tiff's body).
8. E.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987).
9. E.g., Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 716 (alleging that prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol
(DES) increased risk of reproductive system abnormalities in women).
10. E.g., Sterling v. Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. 303, 312-13 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
11. See cases cited infra notes 47-56.
12. As noted in W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KhETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1,
at 3 (5th ed. 1984):
There is no necessity whatever that a tort must have a name. New and nameless torts
are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is mnarked by
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Plaintiffs who claim enhanced risk of disease rely on a number of
damages theories. Most commonly, they allege fear or emotional distress
resulting from their knowledge of the enhanced risk.13 A second theory
involves some form of recovery for the possible future disease itself.14 A
third theory, gaining in popularity, seeks funds to cover necessary medical
monitoring expenses arising from the enhanced risk, such as periodic cancer
screening. 5
This Comment notes that a number of courts experience difficulty in
attempting to fit enhanced risk claims into existing legal theory.' 6 It de-
scribes cases in which plaintiffs allege emotional distress from enhanced
risk of disease;17 cases in which plaintiffs claim enhanced risk as a form of
damages;' 8 and cases in which plaintiffs seek recovery for medical monitor-
ing expenses. 19 The Comment urges jurisdictions that recognize enhanced
risk claims to limit present recovery to medical monitoring and emotional
distress20 and to provide a subsequent remedy, should the disease manifest
itself.2 ' The Comment concludes that the recommended restrictions on
present recovery, coupled with a subsequent remedy for the disease, would
yield a fair and equitable system based on compensation for loss, not
chance.22
I. INTRODUCTION: A REviEw OF TORT LAW
The tort law concepts of injury, harm, and compensable damages are
central to the interpretation of enhanced risk cases. Much confusion in this
area of the law arises from the courts' inconsistent treatment in identifying
a present injury, defining the harm caused by the injury, and granting an
appropriate remedy.'
many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new
cause of action, where none had been recognized before.
13. E.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987); see infra notes 31-71
and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Fournier J. Gale II & James L. Goyer III, Recovery for Cancerphobia and
Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CuMB. L. REv. 723, 736-43 (1985) (discussing recovery for in-
creased disease risk).
15. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
16. For a brief discussion of traditional tort law theory, see infra notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
17. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 72-160 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 190-91.
23. See, e.g., infra notes 89-102 (discussing concept of injury when enhanced risk claims do
not accompany severe physical harm).
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As defined in the Second Restatement of Torts, injury is "the invasion
of any legally protected interest of another."' The most common form of
iijury is harm.' As used in the Restatement, harm "denote[s] the existence
of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any
cause."2 6 The terms "injury" and "harm" overlap; to be a legally protected
interest in many tort causes of action, the injury to the plaintiff must involve
harm.27
Once a cause of action arises, a plaintiff can recover "damages from
[the defendant] for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused
by the tort."28 The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's breach of duty was the legal cause of an injury resulting
in the harm.29 Once the plaintiff has established the existence of harm,
however, the Restatement indicates that the extent of the harm does not
have to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff need
only establish the extent of the harm "with as much certainty as the nature
of the tort and the circumstances permit."30
T1. EMOTIONAL DisTREss AND FEAR OF DISEASE
Claims for fear or emotional distress are probably the most common
mechanisms by which plaintiffs seek recovery for enhanced risk of disease.
Historically, courts have allowed recovery for fear of disease as part of pain
and suffering damages arising from a physical injury.3' In early cases, not
every claim for fear of disease accompanying a physical injury was com-
pensable. Courts viewed fear as compensable only if it was reasonable and
based on short-term risks of limited duration.32 Claims based on unreason-
24. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 7 (1979). See generally Allan Kanner, Emerging
Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERs LJ. 343, 351-56
(1987) (discussing requirement of injury in tort law).
25. A comment in the Second Restatement of Torts states that "[tihe most usual form of
injury is the infliction of some harm; but there may be an injury although no harm is done."
RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1979). Further, injury "denote[s] the type of result
which, if the act which causes it is tortious, is sufficient to sustain an action even though there is
no harm for which compensatory damages can be given." Id. The Restatement comment also
acknowledges that "[t]he meaning of the word 'injury,' as here defined, differs from the sense in
which the word 'injury' is often used, to indicate that the invasion of the interest in question has
been caused by conduct of such a character as to make it tortious." Id.
26. Id. § 7.
27. Id. § 7 cmt. a. Some torts, such as trespass and battery, do not require that injury involve
harm. Id. Others, such as negligence, require the plaintiff to prove harm. Id. § 328A.
28. Id. § 910 (emphasis added).
29. Id. §912&cmt. a.
30. Id. § 912.
31. Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a
Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 527, 542-43 (1984).
32. Id. at 543.
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able fears or long-term risks with unlimited duration were not compensable
because they were not premised on "sound probability."33
In early cases, plaintiffs could recover for fear of diseases that had
limited duration, such as rabies and lockjaw. In later cases, courts began to
allow compensation for fear of diseases with delayed manifestation, 34 such
as cancer or asbestosis. 35 As with the earlier cases, courts usually required
a physical injury. 6
In 1958, for example, the New York Court of Appeals sustained an
award for fear of cancer.37 The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice ac-
tion against a physician who had given her radiation therapy for bursitis. 38
The radiation treatments resulted in nausea, bums, and scarring. 39 The
plaintiff alleged injury from excessive radiation and presented evidence of
mental anguish that was caused when a second physician told her she had
an enhanced risk of cancer that would require lifelong medical monitor-
ing.4° The plaintiffs attorney made it clear that they were "'not making
any claim that this person is going to sustain a cancer,"' but that they were
"'going on a neurosis."' 41 The court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff
that included damages for fear of cancer.42
Reasonableness of the fear and likelihood of the disease are important
factors in cases involving long-term risk. In Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital,
Inc.,43 for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied recovery when
the plaintiff alleged fear of future cancer-a disease risk of long-term dura-
tion. Howard arose when a catheter broke inside the plaintiff's shoulder
and two of its pieces were lost inside her body.44 Although the defendants
conceded negligence, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover for
her "fear of future cancer" with a "claim of damages... so remote and so
33. Id. Courts have permitted recovery, for example, when the plaintiff claimed fear of ra-
bies from an animal bite, fear of lockjaw and blood poisoning from a wound, and fear of miscar-
riage arising from injury to an expectant mother. Id. at 542-43.
34. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(involving manifestation of asbestosis delayed 10 to 25 years after exposure) (citing Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974)); Irving J. Selikoff & Douglas H. K. Lee, AsBESros AND DisEAsn 205 (1978)).
35. Asbestosis is a lung disease "produced by inhaling asbestos fibers." Wilber v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 1991).
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
37. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 253 (N.Y. 1958).
38. Id. at 250-51.
39. Id. at 250.
40. Id. at 251.
41. Id. (quoting the plaintiffs attorney at trial).
42. Id. at 253.
43. 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974).
44. Id. at 384.
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out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor."'4 The court con-
cluded "as a matter of public policy... that the defendants are not to be
held liable for this element of damages."'
In the absence of an actionable physical injury, a plaintiff may seek to
recover damages for fear of disease in a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. When the allegations merely involve
anguish due to enhanced disease risk, however, courts have been reluctant
to grant recovery.4 7 This hesitation stems in part from the plaintiff's inabil-
ity to prove a physical impact or manifestation, which most states require as
an element for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 48 Because
some states have started to relax the requirement of a physical impact or
manifestation, 49 this inquiry eventually could shift to an analysis of the seri-
ousness of the emotional harm and the reasonableness of the fear.50
Among courts with a physical impact or manifestation requirement,
some view a plaintiff's exposure to the disease-causing substance as physi-
cal impact,51 essentially circumventing the requirement. In Sterling v. Vel-
sicol Chemical Corp.,"2 a federal district court held the defendants "liable
45. Id. at 385.
46. Id.
47. Dworkin, supra note 31, at 542-43; see, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171,
181 (Mass. 1982) (holding that, absent physical harm, there is no cause of action for emotional
distress in an enhanced risk of disease case).
48. KuEEoN Er AL., supra note 12, § 54 (noting that physical impact is generally required for
emotional distress tort unless special circumstances, such as negligent handling of a corpse, guar-
antee that the claim is not spurious). A number of DES cases have rejected a plaintiffs claim of
emotional distress from risk of future disease. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbot Lab., 568 F. Supp.
920, 926-27 (D.R.I. 1983) (requiring physical manifestation); Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 174-76 & n.5
(citations omitted) (holding that, absent "extreme and outrageous behavior," physical harm is re-
quired). But cf. Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. ll. 1983)
(holding that prenatal exposure to DES is an impact). For further discussion of the physical injury
or manifestation requirement, see Frances C. Whiteman, Comment, Toxic Emotional Distress
Claims: The Emerging Trend for Recovery Absent Physical Injury, 20 CAP. U. L. Rrv. 995,
997-1006 (1991).
49. In North Carolina, for example, there is no physical impact or manifestation requirement
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology
Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990). Ruark limits recovery to severe emotional distress, de-
fined by the court as "any emotional or mental disorder, such as... neurosis, psychosis, chronic
depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which
may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id.
50. Whiteman, supra note 48, at 1014 (proposing as a prerequisite to recovery that fear of
disease be reasonable and serious); see infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
51. E.g., Wetherhill, 565 F. Supp. at 1560 (holding that prenatal exposure to DES is an
impact); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Tenn. 1982) (finding that
exposure to chlordane in drinking water is an impact); see also Dworldn, supra note 31, at 546
('Toxic tort claimants should be able to recover under the traditional impact rule.").
52. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th
Cir. 1988). Drawing on Laxton, 639 S.W.2d 431, the Sterling court found exposure to chemical
contaminants to be a physical impact. 647 F. Supp. at 320. In Laxton, the plaintiffs alleged that
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... upon the legal theories of strict liability, common law negligence, tres-
pass and nuisance" when chemicals from the defendant's waste burial site
leached into the plaintiffs' water wells. 3 According to the court, a physical
impact occurred when "Velsicol's conduct caused chemical contaminants to
come in contact with or invade each particular plaintiff's body."54 The
court held that the plaintiffs could recover for emotional distress exper-
ienced at the time of exposure to the chemicals that "were of such a nature
as to cause [the plaintiffs'] symptoms and cellular damage, and adverse
biological change, (however slight)."' 5 The plaintiffs could recover addi-
tionally for the distress experienced on learning of the "nature and possible
effects of those chemical contaminants... up to the present time and even
into the future."'56
Whether plaintiffs base emotional distress damages on an actionable
physical injury, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, or
some other cause of action,57 the reasonableness of their distress is always
an issue. 8 Evidence of enhanced risk can be relevant to the reasonableness
of the distress-logically, the higher the probability of future disease occur-
rence, the more reasonable a plaintiff's distress.
Courts have been fairly lenient in admitting evidence of enhanced risk
in cases involving fear or distress. A number of courts have allowed evi-
dence of enhanced risk when the occurrence of future disease is merely
possible: in other words, a likelihood of less than fifty percent.5 9
the defendants contaminated their drinking water spring with chlordane, a toxic chemical linked to
cancer. 639 S.W.2d at 434. The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with the jury instructions
that stated in pertinent part:
If [the plaintiffs] ingested any amount of the toxic substance, it is the judgment of the
Court that that is at least a technical physical injury. But it is not an injury from which
they are entitled to substantial damages under the facts of this case, that is[,] from a
physical injury.
But, where there is any physical injury at all-any attendant mental pain and suf-
fering is compensable.
Id. (alterations in original).
53. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 311.
54. Id. at 320.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 320-21. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the award, but found it excessive.
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. In Wetherhill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983), for
example, the plaintiffs sought compensation for emotional distress arising from the defendants'
failure to wam.
58. E.g., id. at 1559.
59. E.g., id.; Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 263-64 (N.J. 1989); see Dale P.
Faulkner & Kerin M. Woods, Fear of Future Disability--An Element of Damages in a Personal
Injury Action, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. R-v. 865, 868-70 (discussing standard of proof trend away from
requirement of probability).
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In Wetherill v. University of Chicago,6" class action plaintiffs sought
recovery for emotional distress damages when they suffered prenatal expo-
sure to DES. The federal district court denied the defendant's motion to
exclude enhanced risk testimony,6 noting that "traditional notions of proxi-
mate cause . . . merely demand[ ] a reasonable fear, not a high degree of
likelihood, that the feared contingency be likely to occur."6 Further, the
court indicated that "fears of future injury can be reasonable even where the
likelihood of such injury is relatively low."'63 The court cited a 1980 Penn-
sylvania case in which an award for distress was upheld, even though the
plaintiff's physicians were certain her fears of "cancer, heart attack and pre-
mature death were medically unfounded."'  The court also referred to an
earlier Louisiana case in which the plaintiffs received compensation for dis-
tress resulting from a two to five percent chance of developing epilepsy.6'
In Kosmacek v. Farm Service Co-op of Persia,66 the Iowa Court of
Appeals took a stricter stance on evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiffs'
claims. The plaintiffs were landowners alleging that they experienced
mental anguish after learning that chemicals had leaked onto their property.
The court indicated that recovery for mental anguish would be denied un-
less the plaintiffs were to "present substantial evidence of severe emotional
distress."'6 7 This would require "reliable data available linking the particu-
lar herbicide the plaintiffs were exposed to to an increased future risk of...
disease." 68 The court suggested that the degree of risk might be important
in evaluating reasonableness, specifically stating that the plaintiffs must be
"aware they possess an increased statistical likelihood of developing cancer,
and from this knowledge springs a reasonable apprehension which
manifests itself in emotional distress. '69
60. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
61. Id. at 1561.
62. Id. at 1559.
63. Id. (citations omitted); see also Faulkner & Woods, supra note 59, at 872-74 (discussing
cancerphobia with reference to the Wetherill case).
64. Wetherhill, 565 F. Supp. at 1559 (citing Murphy v. Pennsylvania Fruit Co., 418 A.2d
480, 482, 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)); see also Wisner v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 537 So. 2d 740,
748-49 (La. Ct. App. 1988), writ denied, 540 So. 2d 342 (La. 1989). In Wisner, a state trooper
developed acute symptoms of headache, cough, shortness of breath, and difficulty swallowing
after exposure to toxic chemicals from a derailed freight train. Id. at 743. The Louisiana Court of
Appeals held that evidence of increased risk of cancer was admissible to show the reasonableness
of the plaintiffs fear of cancer. 1d. at 748-49. The Wisner court cautioned, however, that such
evidence would not be admissible if its prejudice to the defendant substantially outweighed its
probative value. Id.
65. Wetherhill, 565 F. Supp. at 1559-60 (citing Heider v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of
Wis., 231 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (La. Ct. App. 1970)).
66. 485 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa. Ct. App. 1992).
67. Id. at 104.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 105.
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Regardless of the restrictions imposed by the courts, there is no evi-
dentiary rule that would render inadmissible evidence of possible future dis-
ease.70 Wigmore's treatise on evidence merely indicates that evidence of
enhanced risk should "involve rational inferences from adequate data."'"
1I. ENHANCED RISK OF DIsEAsE
Unlike a traditional claim for fear or emotional distress, a claim for
enhanced risk of disease involves compensation for an ailment that may
never occur. Professors Gale and Goyer have termed recovery for potential
disease a "present recovery for the probability of future injury."'72
A recurring theme runs through enhanced risk of disease cases: the
struggle to find an injury and define the harm. 73 To this end, courts debate,
define, and redefine the terms "injury" and "harm." Although notions of
injury and harm can become muddied with the issue of proximate cause,
courts inevitably examine the nature of the present injury and the magnitude
of enhanced risk in deciding whether to compensate the plaintiff.
Although courts usually do not acknowledge it, the level of proof that
the cases require with regard to the enhanced risk of disease varies accord-
ing to the nature and severity of the present injury and the magnitude of the
enhanced risk. As indicated by the Second Restatement of Torts, a plaintiff
must establish the existence of injury, along with the other elements of the
tort, by a preponderance of the evidence.74 Similarly, a plaintiff must prove
the existence of harm by a preponderance of the evidence. The extent of
this harm, however, only requires proof to a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty.75 Certainty varies, therefore, according to whether the court views
70. JOHN H. WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 663 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1979).
71. Id. When the enhanced risk is merely possible, not necessarily probable or likely, courts
should not automatically refuse to consider the evidence. Id.
It must be said that the courts have in many of these rulings proceeded upon a confused
apprehension of a legitimate doctrine of the law of torts, namely, that recovery may be
had for such injurious consequences only as are fairly certain or probable, not for merely
possible harm. That is, a court, in holding that the physician may not testify to possible
harmful consequences, is not always ruling that testimony to possible consequences is
evidentially improper, but is meaning to rule that such possible consequences are as a
matter of substantive law not entitled to consideration at all. . . . But the evidential
doctrine in question has little standing elsewhere, and should not be extended.
Id.
72. Gale & Goyer, supra note 14, at 724.
73. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984) (citations omit-
ted) (explaining that "accompanying physical injury" is required to recover future damages for
enhanced risk of disease); Gale & Goyer, supra note 14, at 736-41.
74. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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the enhanced risk as evidence of a present injury, the existence of harm, or
the extent of the harm.76
A. Enhanced Risk Accompanied by an Injury
1. Severe Injury
With a severe concomitant physical injury, such as a head trauma or a
fractured bone, many courts allow the jury to consider evidence of en-
hanced risk of disease as going to the extent and permanency of the harm.7 7
When offered in this context, evidence of enhanced risk need only be
proven to a reasonable degree of certainty. In the words of Judge Posner's
dissent in DePass v. United States,7" "the extent of [the plaintiffs] injury
[is] an issue on which courts traditionally do not impose a heavy burden of
proof."7 9 An injury would be worth more as a present injury when evi-
dence of future disease is presented than when it is suppressed.
A few courts view the enhanced susceptibility itself as a compensable
present harm, as distinguished from enhanced risk that reflects the extent of
injury.8 0 In other words, a plaintiff receives compensation for the presently
existing harm of increased susceptibility to disease.81 The amount of com-
pensation increases as the likelihood of future disease increases. In this
way, a plaintiff with a severe injury can receive a higher award when the
injury is augmented by the present harm of enhanced susceptibility to future
disease. Although courts would require a plaintiff to prove that the exist-
76. RESTATEmErr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979); see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1374-76 (1981) (discussing lower standards of proof for extent
of harm).
77. See, e.g., Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding
permanent risk of life-threatening complications supported damage award), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (permitting
jury to consider evidence regarding increased risk of arthritis from the plaintiffs existing knee
injury); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984) (allowing compensation for increased
risk of disease if supported by substantial evidence); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675,
680 (Or. 1973) (involving damages for enhanced susceptibility to meningitis); Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 408-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (allowing compensation for five percent
risk of epileptic seizures); Jordon v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 635 (W. Va. 1974) (holding that
testimony that injury is permanent is sufficient to take evidence of "latent, unpredictable... and
obscure" manifestation of the injury to the jury); see infra note 82 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Schwegel).
78. 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In DePass, the majority applied the
clearly erroneous standard of review and upheld a lower court's decision not to compensate a
plaintiff for increased risk of cardiovascular disease when the plaintiffs leg was amputated trau-
matically in an automobile accident. Id. at 206.
80. See, e.g., Feist, 517 P.2d at 678-80 (holding that enhanced risk of meningitis in a plaintiff
with skull fracture is compensable as a present disability).
81. Id. at 680.
1994]
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ence of enhanced susceptibility is more likely than not, the extent of the
susceptibility could be proven with a lesser showing-a reasonable degree
of certainty. Because of the manner in which courts view enhanced risk
when it accompanies a severe injury, even a low probability of contracting
future disease can support an award for damages that include enhanced
risk.
82
Nevertheless, some courts require that enhanced risk be "more likely
than not" before they will admit it as evidence, even when a plaintiff has
sustained a severe injury.83 In Davidson v. Miller,84 for example, a young
girl brought suit for injuries sustained when she was hit by the defendant's
car.85 The Maryland Court of Appeals refused to allow a physician's testi-
mony that the girl might experience complications during childbirth later in
life.86 The court reasoned that "'evidence of prospective damage must be
in terms of the certain or probable and not of the possible."' 87 Even when
the testimony quantifies the risk, some courts will not admit evidence of
less than a fifty percent risk.88
2. Enhanced Risk Absent Severe Physical Injury
The analysis becomes much more complicated when a plaintiff's en-
hanced risk claim does not arise from a severe physical injury. In this situa-
tion, the existence of a present injury is less clear, and enhanced risk does
not fit neatly into the damages claim as an element of the extent of the
harm.
When courts attempt to link the concept of a present injury with the
notion of enhanced risk of disease, inconsistencies abound. In an effort to
identify a present injury in these cases, some courts adopt the view that
subcellular or cellular damage can constitute injury.89 In Gideon v.
82. E.g., Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 408-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). In Schwegel,
the court permitted compensation for a five percent increased risk of future epilepsy in a child
with a severe head injury. Even with this low probability of epilepsy, the Schwegel court reasoned
that the damages could include recovery for increased risk because there was "no speculation or
guessing" about the existence of present injury. Id. at 408-09; see also Robert F. Brachtenbach,
Future Damages in Personal Injury Actions-The Standard of Proof, 3 GoNz. L. REv. 75, 84-88
(1968) (arguing that possible future consequences and their probabilities should be considered
admissible).
83. MARmYN MnmzR ETr AL., DAmAGEs iN TORT AcroNs § 13.30 (1991).
84. 344 A.2d 422 (Md. 1975), cited in MwmzR, supra note 83, § 13.30.
85. Id. at 424.
86. Id. at 428.
87. Id. at 427 (quoting Calder v. Levi, 177 A. 392, 394 (Md. 1935)).
88. See McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 312 N.W.2d 37, 44-45 (Wis. 1981), cited in
Muz , supra note 83, § 13.30.
89. E.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying Texas law); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982);
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Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,9" the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law,
the injury to a plaintiff who had contracted asbestosis was "the inhalation of
[asbestos] fibers and the invasion of his body by those fibers, thus causing
him physical damage." 9' Similarly, in Bradford v. Susquehanna Corp., a
federal district court in Colorado allowed the plaintiff to present evidence
supporting present injury in the form of damage to chromosomes from radi-
92ation exposure.
Alternatively, courts have viewed the enhanced risk of disease itself as
the present injury.93 In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,94 a federal dis-
trict court characterized enhanced susceptibility to disease as "a presently
existing condition in each plaintiff who suffered exposure to the various
toxins."95 Still other courts argue that the exposure constitutes the injury.
In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,96 the Fifth Circuit deemed expo-
sure to asbestos to be the plaintiff's injury.97 Further, in Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Services,98 the plaintiff sustained an ascertainable injury when he
was drenched with toxic chemicals because he suffered "[d]izziness, leg
cramps, and a persistent stinging sensation in [his] feet and fingers." 99
see also Gale & Goyer, supra note 14, at 739-40 (citing Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F.
Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984)).
90. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 1137. The court described the theory of recovery as follows:
[The plaintiff] inhaled asbestos fibers while working with defective asbestos products.
This initiated a scarring process that destroyed some of the air sacs in his lungs. Other
changes occurred as the fibers worked through his lung tissues and lodged in the mem-
brane surrounding his lungs, causing pleural thickening, plaques, calcifications, and as-
bestosis as well as the likely future development of mesothelioma and cancer.
Id.
92. 586 F. Supp. at 17-18.
93. E.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (apply-
ing Tennessee law), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Ayers v.
Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 305 (NJ. 1987). Although the Ayers court viewed increased
risk of disease as an injury, compensation for the injury required "that the apprehended conse-
quences [be] reasonably probable." Id. at 305 (citing Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1959)).
94. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th
Cir. 1988); see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
95. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 321.
96. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
97. Id. at 412 (applying Mississippi law).
98. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
99. Id. at 317.
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Some courts, however, reject these views of injury altogether.1t 0 For
example, the Third Circuit in Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp."'1 re-
jected the notion that subclinical damage could constitute an injury:
It is true that the possible existence of subclinical asbestos-related
injury prior to manifestation may be of interest to a histolo-
gist .... Likewise, the existence of such injury may be of vital
concern to insurers and their insureds who have bargained for lia-
bility coverage triggered by "bodily injury."... We believe, how-
ever, that subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is
insufficient to constitute the actual loss or damage to a plaintiff's
interest required to sustain a cause of action under generally ap-
plicable principles of tort law. 102
In cases of enhanced risk unaccompanied by severe injury, a number
of courts follow what is called the "traditional American rule" that "recov-
ery of damages based on future consequences may be had only if such con-
sequences are 'reasonably certain."' 1 3 Thus, before awarding damages,
most courts require the plaintiff to prove a "significantly enhanced risk of
injury."' ' The plaintiff meets this burden by proving that the occurrence
of disease is reasonably probable, or more likely than not. 105
100. The Arizona Court of Appeals, for example, held that the existence of asbestos fibers in
the lungs of persons living near an asbestos mine did not constitute an injury. Bums v. Jaquays
Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see also Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744
P.2d 705, 707 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that exposure to asbestos is not an injury). Also
rejecting the aforementioned notions of injury, the Eighth Circuit in Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d
261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983), held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim when they alleged that they were subject to a high risk of cellular damage because their
fathers had been exposed to nuclear explosions. Id. at 269. The court explained that "a lawsuit
for personal injuries cannot be based only upon the mere possibility of some future harm." Id.
Similarly, in Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 381 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), when a
family brought suit against an exterminating company for misapplication of pesticides in their
home, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the motion granting a directed verdict to the defend-
ant. Id. at 298. The court held that an excess of pesticides in the blood of children does not
constitute an injury. Id. at 297-98.
101. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
102. Id. at 942 (citations omitted); see also Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713,
719 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (applying Illinois law); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376
(111. 1979) (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that DES-induced latent injury constitutes a present
injury). In Mink, a United States district court held that exposure to DES does not constitute an
injury. 460 F. Supp. at 719. The court reasoned that "[tihe closest the complaint comes to alleg-
ing physical injury is the allegation of a 'risk' of cancer. The mere fact of risk without any
accompanying physical injury is insufficient to state a claim ... ." Id.
103. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Morrissey, 394 N.E.2d at 1376; Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md.
1983). See generally King, supra note 76, at 1371-73 (discussing reasonable certainty
requirement).
104. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 307 (N.J. 1987) (citations omitted).
105. REsTATeMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 912 cmt. e (1979); see e.g., Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.) (applying "more likely than not" test), modifled, 797
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The Gideon court" 6 enunciated this standard of proof as follows:
The time-honored method of proving future physical condition is
to present a qualified physician's opinion testimony based on rea-
sonable medical probability. Possibility alone cannot serve as the
basis for recovery, for mere possibility does not meet the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard. Certainty, however, is not re-
quired: the plaintiff need demonstrate only that the event is more
likely to occur than not.'0 7
In Gideon, the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of damages when a plain-
tiff's expert testified that there was a "'greater than [fifty] percent risk"'
that the plaintiff would die of an asbestos-related cancer.' Similarly, in
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., °9 the Fifth Circuit permitted a
plaintiff to recover for the increased risk of cancer following exposure to
asbestos when "evidence adduced at trial indicate[d] that he [had] a
greater than fifty percent chance of getting cancer."" 0
B. Enhanced Risk as a Cause of Action
Although most courts consider enhanced risk claims to be an element
of damages, there is some support for an enhanced risk cause of action. The
Missouri Court of Appeals, in Elam v. Alcolac,"' described two basic
forms that enhanced risk causes of action can assume: (1) a present injury
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.)
(applying "reasonable probability" test), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 321-22 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (same), affid in part and rev'd in part,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D.
Mass. 1986) (same); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983)
(applying "greater than 50% chance" test); Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401, 411 (N.J.
1962) (applying "probable" test); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 4.95 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div. 1985) (applying "reasonable medical probability" test). But see Mauro v.
Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 265 (NJ. 1989) (citing cases that indicated risk less than 50%
might still be admissible: Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 82-2686, 1985 WL 6074
(D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985) (allowing admission of evidence that the plaintiff suffering from asbestosis
had 43% likelihood of contracting lung cancer to prove claim based on enhanced risk of cancer);
Lewitt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-2950, letter op. at 5 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 1985) (holding
admissible statistical evidence of increased risk of cancer among plaintiffs with asbestosis,
although less than a reasonable medical probability, to support claim for enhanced risk of cancer);
Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-2907, bench op. at 34-37 (D.NJ. 1984) (allowing
admission of evidence that plaintiff with asbestosis was exposed to 40 to 45% risk of contracting
cancer to support claim for damages based on enhanced risk of cancer)).
106. Gideon v. Johns-Manviile Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); see infra notes
146-47 and accompanying text (discussing Gideon).
107. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137-38.
108. Id. at 1138.
109. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
110. Id. at 413 (applying Mississippi law).
111. 765 S.W.2d 42, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1992).
19941
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with future consequences, or (2) an invasion of a legally protected interest
actionable absent any other manifestation.
The first, described in Elam,
treats the cause of action as a present injury with future conse-
quences. It allows recovery if the toxic exposure has induced
some biological manifestation from which the anticipated cancer
is reasonably certain to occur-as quantified by expert testimony
as a probability of occurrence of greater than fifty percent. If the
cause of action is proven, there is a full recovery of damages as
for a realized cancer.' 12
In fact, this form of action involves viewing recovery for enhanced
disease risk as tantamount to recovery for the future disease itself. Accord-
ingly, enhanced risk would compensable only for future diseases that are
likely to occur. The Second Restatement of Torts provides some guidance
on this. Comment e to Section 912 states that a plaintiff is "entitled to
recover damages not only for harm already suffered, but also for that which
probably will result in the future.""' 3 This supports the notion set forth by
the Elam court: A plaintiff can receive compensation when future harm is
probable, but recovery will be denied when future harm does not rise to this
level of certainty. Under the traditional rule, therefore, unless the plaintiff
meets the burden of proof, recovery is "limited to damages for harm already
manifest.""'
The second type of enhanced risk cause of action in Elam treats in-
creased risk of cancer as the present invasion of a legally protected interest,
and hence actionable even absent manifestation of injury. The increased
risk, quantified by expert testimony as a percentage or probability, deter-
mines the recovery. If the cause of action is proven, the damages are
112. Id. (citing Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411; Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188
(6th Cir. 1988); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984)).
113. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. e (1979).
114. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This "'all or
nothing' approach" is questioned by proponents of the "pro rata" approach applied in Britain. Id.
at 120 n.44. Under the British approach, plaintiffs are awarded a proportion of the total recovery
which reflects the risk that they would contract a future disease. Id. For example, a plaintiff with
a 60% chance of contracting cancer would receive 60% of the total compensation awardable for
the full-blown disease. As the Wilson court noted, however, "[ajithough the 'pro rata' approach
may insure that the wrongdoer pays the appropriate amount to the injured class as a whole, it does
not eliminate the inequity among individual plaintiffs: Plaintiffs who in fact sustain the future
harm are undercompensated, while those who escape it receive a windfall." Id.; see also Ander-
son v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Mass. 1986). The Anderson court simi-
larly reasoned that "to award damages based on a mere mathematical probability would
significantly undercompensate those who actually do develop cancer and would be a windfall to
those who do not." Id. (citing Arnett v. Dow Chemical Corp., No. 729586, slip. op. at 15 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1983)).
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awarded for the disease, but are proportionately reduced by the quantified
probability that the plaintiff will not manifest the disease."'
A federal district court followed this approach in Sterling v. Vel-
sicol.1l6 Applying Tennessee law, the court upheld compensation based in
part on increased susceptibility to disease. The evidence showed that the
plaintiffs more likely than not possessed a heightened susceptibility, but had
failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs would, more likely than not, con-
tract the disease. The court viewed susceptibility itself as a present injury,
emphasizing that enhanced susceptibility was "not a speculative future in-
jury" and cited several cases in support of the proposition that "[c]ourts
have regularly upheld awards for such a claim.""' 7
In fact, the cases cited in Sterling all involved compensation for en-
hanced susceptibility when the plaintiff had experienced a severe physical
injury. Thus, the district court in Sterling actually was extending the pre-
vailing doctrine associated with severe injury cases-which permitted re-
covery for even low levels of enhanced risk-to enhanced risk without
severe injury." l8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in Sterling reversed the district court's
award for enhanced risk." 9 The court relied on the premise that enhanced
risk is a future consequence, instead of a present injury.' 20 The court stated,
"Where the basis for awarding damages is the potential risk of susceptibility
to future disease, the predicted future disease must be medically reasonably
certain to follow from the existing present injury."''
Most courts require the plaintiff to quantify the enhanced risk of dis-
ease before recognizing an enhanced risk cause of action.' 22 As the
115. Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 208 (citing Pelcha v. United Amusement Co., 606 P.2d 1168, 1169
(Or. CL App. 1980); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 640 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely, J., concurring);
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 7 (1965); Gale & Goyer, supra note 14, at 742; Barton C.
Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. Rav. 563, 589 (1984);
David S. Pegno, Note, An Analysis of the Enhanced Risk Cause of Action (or How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste), 33 Vni.. L. REv. 437, 456 (1988)).
116. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
118. It is also notable that the case cited as Tennessee precedent, Laxton v. Orkin, 639 S.W.2d
431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (cited at Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 320), involved a claim for emotional
distress, not a claim for enhanced risk. As discussed earlier, enhanced risk of less than 50% often
can support an award for emotional distress. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
119. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d at 1205.
120. See generally id at 1204-05 (discussing enhanced risk).
121. Id. at 1204.
122. See Elam v. Alcolac, 765 S.W.2d 42, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that proof of
enhanced risk cause of action "requires opinion of quantified probability of disease"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 817 (1992); see also, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D.
Mass 1986) (rejecting an unquantified claim of enhanced risk); Eagle-Pitcher Indus. v. Cox, 281
So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to recognize a plaintiff's unquantified en-
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Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned in Ayers v. Township of Jackson,123
"[i]t is clear that the recognition of an 'enhanced risk' cause of action,
particularly when the risk is unquantified, would generate substantial litiga-
tion that would be difficult to manage and resolve."'"4 The court indicated,
however, that refusal to recognize this cause of action would deny some
plaintiffs compensation for their injuries."25 As a compromise, the court
required the plaintiffs to quantify the risk and "decline[d] to recognize
plaintiffs' cause of action for the unquantified enhanced risk of disease." 12 6
C. Statutes of Limitations Considerations
To some extent, statute of limitations considerations contribute to the
confusion in cases involving enhanced risk of disease and often will influ-
ence the results. When the applicable statute does not specify the tolling
date, courts must determine that issue by deciding on an accrual date-the
time at which the cause of action arises. In this regard, courts must con-
sider the competing policies behind statutes of limitations: preventing un-
fairness to plaintiffs who pursue their claims with reasonable diligence
while at the same time ensuring a degree of repose to defendants. 127
There are two major approaches to determining the statute of limita-
tions tolling date in enhanced risk cases. The first is known as the tradi-
tional rule: "Tlhe cause of action ... accrue[s] at the time of invasion of
[the] body."'128 The United States Supreme Court criticized this rule in
Urie v. Thompson, z2 a silicosis 13° case brought under the Federal Employ-
hanced risk claim); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 267 (N.J. 1989) (affirming appellate
court's restriction based on expert's inability to quantify risk); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525
A.2d 287, 305 (NJ. 1987) (requiring the plaintiff to quantify risk of future disease in order to
recover damages).
123. 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987).
124. Id. at 307.
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. In arriving at this compromise, the court considered "the speculative nature of an
unquantified enhanced risk claim, the difficulties inherent in adjudicating such claims, and the
policies underlying the [New Jersey] Tort Claims Act," which encourage courts to "'exercise
restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action against public entities."' Id. (quoting Com-
ment, N.J. STAT. ANN. 59:2-1). New Jersey continues to follow the Ayers approach. In Vuocolo
v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 573 A.2d 196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 585
A.2d 349 (NJ. 1990), the New Jersey Superior Court addressed the issue of unquantified risk in a
wrongful death case. The suit was brought on behalf of a woman who died of pancreatic cancer
after being exposed to dioxin. Id. at 197. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the exposure had
increased the decedent's risk of contracting cancer. Id. The court upheld dismissal of the claim
because the plaintiff could not quantify decedent's enhanced risk of cancer. Id. at 201-02.
127. Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983).
128. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979); see also Steinhardt v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (N.Y. 1981) (applying traditional rule), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982).
129. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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ees Liability Act.13' The Court called the rule a "delusive" remedy when
applied to "unknown and inherently unknowable" harm.'32
Under the second approach, known as the discovery rule, "a 'cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knows or through the exercise of due dili-
gence should have known of the injury."" 33 Many commentators support
this rule,13a and the trend among courts is to depart from the traditional rule
and follow the discovery rule instead.135
In addition to the two major rules, some courts create variants. For
example, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,136 the plaintiff brought
a strict liability suit against an asbestos manufacturer after contracting as-
bestosis. The complaint included a claim for enhanced risk of future can-
cer. Applying the law of Mississippi, which had not adopted the discovery
rule, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's injury consisted of the actual
inhalation of asbestos fibers.' 37 Although refusing to adopt the discovery
rule, the court held that "[i]t was not an actionable injury .... meaning it
was not legally cognizable, until at least one .evil effect of the inhalation
130. Silicosis is a latent disease caused by exposure to silicon. Id. at 166.
131. See id. at 165 (citing act codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1989)). The plaintiff also
claimed a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act. See id. at 167 (citing act currently codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 23, 28-34 (1989)).
132. Urie, 337 U.S. at 169.
133. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting
Bums v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C. App. 1979), a medical malpractice case); see also Hag-
erty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir.) ("When the fact of the injury does
occur, if discovered by the victim, the cause of action accrues."), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1986); Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671, 674 (D.D.C. 1981) (applying
discovery rule in risk of disease case); Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, 428 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C.
1975) (applying discovery rule), aff'd, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967
(1977); Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., 817 P.2d 111, 113 (Colo. 1991) (citing Financial As-
soc. v. G.E. Johnson Constr. Co., 723 P.2d 135, 138 (Colo. 1986), for the proposition that statute
of limitations does not begin to run at the mere discovery of a physical process leading to an
injury); Wilber v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74,78 (Iowa 1991) (holding that
the "manifestation of asbestosis does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all
separate, distinct, and later-manifested diseases" arising from the same exposure); Jones v. Buck,
599 A.2d 609, 610 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (applying the discovery rule); Fibreboard
Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that statute of limitations under
Texas law "commences when the injured party discovers, or in the exercise of ordinary care,
should have discovered, the injury") (citing Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex.
1988)).
134. Jerry J. Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limita-
tions, 56 N.C. L. Ra,. 663, 675-76 (1978).
135. John K. Strauder, Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. Rav. 615, 629 & n.97
(1982) (noting that some courts may prefer to create exceptions to the traditional rule rather than
explicitly adopt the discovery rule).
136. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986).
137. Id. at 412.
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became manifest. There was no cause of action at all, in other words, until
the asbestosis appeared." 1
38
In Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,'139 the Fifth Circuit applied
Louisiana law, under which "special considerations inform the accrual of a
cause of action for limitations purposes where the damages result from a
non-traumatic initial exposure to the source of potential harm."14 The
court upheld exclusion of the plaintiff's evidence of enhanced risk, reason-
ing that the plaintiff should bring suit at a later date if the cancer material-
ized."' The court emphasized that statutes of limitation differ according to
whether the cause of action relied on a traumatic or nontraumatic injury.1 42
The court quoted the Louisiana Supreme Court for the proposition that:
[I]n modem technology damages from industrial emission and
the like may not become apparent until some years after the oc-
currence. Additionally, it might be impossible for the injured
party to know what or who caused the damage, until an investiga-
tion can be made after the damage in fact becomes apparent. In
such cases, the prescriptive period would run only from the date
the damage becomes apparent. 43
In addition, the court held that the plaintiff was "not confined to a single
day in court," but would "have a new cause of action, with new damages"
for cancer.'"
D. The Single Action Rule Versus the Split Cause of Action
Most jurisdictions require plaintiffs to bring all claims associated with
a given harm in a single cause of action.145 This can be problematic for
138. Id.
139. 727 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at 537.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing DeLaughter v. Borden Co., 364 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1966) (allowing recov-
ery for those damages sustained within one year prior to suit when the ultimate injury was non-
traumatic, i.e., produced "by the passage of time")); see also Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
381 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). The Boyd court noted that in Georgia the discovery rule
was "confined 'to cases of bodily injury which develop only over an extended period of time."'
Id. (quoting Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 368 S.E.2d 732, 732 (Ga.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1989)). At least one commentator has urged the abolishment of
statutes of limitations for "insidious disease litigation." Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Stat-
utes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. Ry. 965, 1012-13 (1988).
143. Adams, 727 F.2d at 537 (citing Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69, 73 (La. 1976)).
144. Id. at 538. The court did indicate that principles of collateral estoppel will apply in any
subsequent suits, in that "the parties will be 'estopped from relitigating ... those issues actually
and necessarily decided in the first suit."' Id. (quoting Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
145. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir.), modified, 797 F.2d 256
(5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Texas law); Manzi v. H.K. Porter Co., 587 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
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plaintiffs alleging enhanced risk of disease. Consider the following expla-
nation by the Fifth Circuit in Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,"4
which followed the majority rule:
While . . . "the threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not
enough," once injury results there is but a single tort and not a
series of separate torts, one for each resultant harm. The cause of
action thus created is for all the damage caused by the single legal
wrong, and a plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seek-
ing damages for some of his injuries in one suit and for
later-developing injuries in another. The cause of action "inheres
in the causative aspects of a breach of a legal duty, the wrongful
act itself, and not in the various forms of harm which result there-
from. . . ." He does not have a discrete cause of action for each
harm. 14
7
Courts are beginning to express dissatisfaction with the single action
rule. In Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services,'48 the Fifth Circuit, reluctantly
bound by precedent, applied the single action rule in a case arising under
federal law. 14 9 The case involved a plaintiff who was soaked with toxic
chemicals as a barge was being loaded. 5 ' The court lamented the unfair-
ness of the single cause of action rule, which prohibited the plaintiff from
bringing suit should he later contract cancer. The court stated:
We volunteer our dissatisfaction with the single cause of action
rule in face of the recurring problem of injured people facing the
possibility of cancer. Those victims should be entitled to recover
for present injuries and, also, for the cancer when and if it later
develops; they should neither be entitled nor compelled to recover
(holding no split cause of action in Pennsylvania), appeal denied, 607 A.2d 254 (Pa. 1992); see
also David G. Poston, Note, Gone Today and Here Tomorrow: Damage Recovery for Subsequent
Developing Latent Diseases in Toxic Tort Exposure Actions, 14 Am. J. TPRAL ADvOC. 159, 161-68
(1990) (discussing single action rule).
146. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
147. Id. at 1136-37 (quoting KEEToN Er AL., supra note 12, § 30, at 165; Andrea G. Nadel,
Annotation, Simultaneous Injury to Person and Property as Giving Rise to a Single Cause of
Action-Modem Cases, 24 A.L.R. 4TH 646, 650 (1983)). In Manzi, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that "once any damages are known, the statute begins to run." 587 A.2d at 779-80.
The court recognized that other courts permit split causes of action, but held that Pennsylvania
does not recognize different diseases "as separate and distinct injuries giving rise to separate
causes of action which each accrue only when the particular injury is discovered." Id. (citing
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1986)).
148. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
149. Id. at 317, 320-21 (citing Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.
1984)).
150. Id. at 317. The court found that the plaintiffs claims for emotional distress and medical
monitoring would withstand summary judgment, but that the enhanced risk claim would not. It
held that the plaintiff could not state a claim for enhanced risk absent evidence of a risk of future
cancer greater than 50%. Id. at 319-20.
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for cancer damages until those damages can be realistically
assessed. 151
A growing minority of states allow the plaintiff to split the cause of
action 152 and sue for each successive disease as it develops.' 3 In Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,"' for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that a plaintiff may bring suit for cancer years after contracting asbes-
tosis.' 55 The court reasoned that these two diseases were separate and dis-
tinct; nevertheless, the court restricted its holding to situations in which the
plaintiff had not sued for the earlier asbestosis.156 Similarly, in Pollock v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,'57 the plaintiff claimed that exposure to asbes-
tos caused pleural thickening and that he was at increased risk of develop-
ing cancer.' 58 Applying New Jersey law, the court granted the defendant's
motion to exclude the issue of enhanced disease risk even though the plain-
tiff was prepared to offer evidence that he had a forty-three percent chance
of developing cancer.'59 The court reserved the plaintiff's right to bring a
subsequent action for the cancer:
[N]otwithstanding the present denial of plaintiff's enhanced risk
claim this Court recognizes plaintiff's "right to sue in the future
should the increased risk created by the exposure to asbestos
come to fruition." In other words: Neither the statute of limita-
tions nor the single controversy rule shall bar toxic-tort claims
instituted after a later discovery of a disease or injury caused by
defendant's conduct, even if there has been prior litigation be-
tween the parties based on the same tortious conduct.160
151. Id. at 317.
152. See id. at 320 ("A few courts have been willing to construe the 'single injury' rule so as
not to preclude a later suit for latent disease.").
153. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117 n.34, 120-21 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (citing REsTATEmENT (SEcoN ) oF JuMEmNs, § 26(1)(b) & cmt. b (1982), for the propo-
sition that the "court in first action may expressly reserve [a] plaintiff's right to maintain second
action" and holding that a plaintiff may split his asbestosis and cancer causes of actions). Nota-
bly, Wilson was not an enhanced risk case; rather, it was a wrongful death action brought by the
widow of a plaintiff who died of mesothelioma, a cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. Id. at
113-14; see also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566,574 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that
exposure to a single type of drug could have resulted in different diseases by separate causal
mechanisms), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F.
Supp. 671, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that suit for death from cancer is not time-barred,
despite diagnosis of asbestosis six years earlier); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d
1020, 1025, 1027 (Md. 1983) (discussed infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text).
154. 464 A.2d 1020 (Md. 1983).
155. Id. at 1025, 1027.
156. Id. at 1027.
157. 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.NJ. 1988).
158. Id. at 489.
159. Id. at 492.
160. Id. (quoting Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. CL Law
Div. 1985)) (citing Mauro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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IV. MEDICAL MoNrroRnG
A number of courts have held that reasonably necessary medical moni-
toring expenses are compensable items of damages.16' In fact, the Fifth
Circuit in Hagerly indicated that, under the "avoidable consequences rule,"
a plaintiff is "required to submit to treatment that is medically advisable;
failure to do so may bar future recovery for a condition he could thereby
have alleviated or avoided."' 62 The level of enhanced disease risk is among
the factors some courts use to decide whether the expenses are reason-
able."'63 As applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court, such factors can
include "the significance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the toxicity
of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at
risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed
[i.e., the level of enhanced risk], and the value of early diagnosis."'"
Courts usually do not require that enhanced risk be quantified for an
award of medical monitoring expenses. 65 In fact, medical monitoring can
be awarded even in the face of a denial of recovery for enhanced risk. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, recognized medical monitoring as
an element of damages in the plaintiffs' viable emotional distress claim, but
rejected a separate claim for unquantified enhanced risk.'66 Similarly, in
Mauro v. Raymark Industries,67 the New Jersey Supreme Court sustained
an award based on medical monitoring expenses while upholding the trial
court's rejection of the plaintiff's enhanced risk claims.' 68
App. Div.), cert. denied, 550 A.2d 455 (NJ. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Mauro v. Raymark Indus. 561
A.2d 257 (NJ. 1989)). The Pollock court indicated that evidence of enhanced risk would be
relevant to show fear of cancer. Id.
161. E.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying
Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287, 312 (N.J. 1987). For further discussion of medical monitoring claims, see generally Allan
Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TuL. ENvTL L.J. 1, 2-4 (1989)
(discussing several cases recognizing a common-law claim for medical monitoring); Kanner,
supra note 24, at 366-69 (same).
162. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.) (citing C. McCoMfcK,
THE LAw oF DAmAGEs § 36 (1935)), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Allan T.
Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of
Toxic Tort Victims, 63 INn. LJ. 849, 865-66 (1988) (discussing avoidable consequences rule as a
justification for medical monitoring).
163. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (analogizing to Reserve
Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)).
164. Id.
165. See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 208-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
evidence showing a significant risk of disease could prove need for medical monitoring, even
though the risk was not quantified), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
166. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312-13.
167. 561 A.2d 257 (NJ. 1989).
168. Id. at 267.
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Many courts addressing medical monitoring claims view the plaintiff's
injury as an invasion of the right not to undergo medical monitoring 69
equivalent to a medical monitoring tort. Friends for All Children v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp.17 is one example in which suit was brought on behalf
of war orphans from Vietnam who had survived a 1975 airplane crash that
occurred as the children were being brought to their adoptive parents. 1 '
The court recognized a cause of action for "diagnostic examinations in the
absence of proof that [the plaintiffs were] physically injured."' 72 The court
explained that the plaintiffs' injury consisted of an invasion of a legally
protected interest in avoiding medical monitoring expenses.' 73 It provided
the following hypothetical to support its reasoning:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding
through a red light. Jones lands on his head with some force.
Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors rec-
ommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine whether
he has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove nega-
tive, but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the sub-
stantial cost of the diagnostic examinations. 74
As the court noted:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoid-
ing expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an
interest in avoiding physical injury. When a defendant negli-
gently invades this interest, the injury to which [interest] is
neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the
defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations.' 75
Moreover, the court indicated that recognition of a medical monitoring
cause of action would deter misconduct and compensate the plaintiff for the
cost of an expense "that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind the commu-
nity generally accepts as part of the wear and tear of daily life."'176
169. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826-27 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (recognizing a right to avoid medical monitoring expenses) (discussed infra notes 170-76);
Mauro, 561 A.2d at 263 (finding a right not to spend money on medical tests). In one case, the
Arizona Court of Appeals implied in dicta that medical surveillance expenses might be recover-
able absent any current physical harm. DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987).
170. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying District of Columbia law).
171. Id. at 818.
172. Id. at 824-25.
173. Id. at 826-27. The court pointed out that injury is defined broadly in the Second Restate-
ment of Torts. Id.; see also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Restate-
ment's definition of injury).
174. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 825.
175. Id. at 826.
176. Id. at 825.
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The Third Circuit recognized medical monitoring as a cause of action
in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.'77 The court held that in order
to establish the need for medical monitoring, a plaintiff must prove:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous
substance through the negligent actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a signifi-
cantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical exami-
nations reasonably necessary.
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early
detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. 178
Experts may differ on whether medical monitoring is necessary for a
given toxic exposure. 179  If reasonably necessary, however, "[s]creening
and close follow-up of the exposed population can lead to early diagnosis
and treatment of potentially fatal diseases. Thus, both the public health and
fairness rationales support awarding such damages."' 0 Accordingly, courts
tend to be receptive to medical monitoring awards, with some recognizing
this as a novel tort.' 8 l
V. CONCLUSION
Courts experience difficulty in their attempts to fit enhanced risk
claims into existing legal theory.'8 2 A number of cormmentators recom-
mend an enhanced risk cause of action.8 3 Under this approach, the en-
hanced risk itself constitutes an injury or invasion of the plaintiff's legally
protected interest. Although courts are reluctant to recognize this cause of
177. 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3rd Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law).
178. Id. A federal district court applying Kentucky law recently applied these elements in
upholding an award for medical monitoring. Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 530, 534
(S.D. W. Va. 1993).
179. See Slagel, supra note 162, at 867-69 (discussing early detection in cancer treatment).
180. Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1, 67 (1993).
181. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
182. One commentator describes this process as the "reasoned integration of new clinical and
scientific knowledge into the body of legal doctrine." Kanner, supra note 24, at 371.
183. E.g., Gregory L. Ash, Comment, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an
Increased Risk Cause of Action, 38 KAN. L. REv. 1087, 1102-07 (1990) (urging that an "actiona-
ble claim" of increased risk be accomplished through a system of defendant-purchased insurance);
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical
Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HAsrNas LJ. 661, 716 (1992) (advocat-
ing periodic payments for medical monitoring); Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk of Dis-
ease-from Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REv. 635, 652 (1985)
(urging adoption of increased risk cause of action with damages to include medical monitoring,
emotional distress, and coverage under a defendant-purchased insurance policy).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
action, 1 they tend to be more willing to accept an approach that amounts
to separate claims for emotional distress18 and medical monitoring.1 86
Regardless of the causes of action employed, courts should consider
limiting recovery for the enhanced risk of disease to necessary medical
monitoring expenses1 87 and emotional distress. This "confines the award to
costs that flow from the specific harm that has occurred, not from the harm
that may occur in the future." 188 Such limitations are consistent with tradi-
tional tort law, which seeks to compensate the injured individual for all
losses which are the direct and proximate consequences of a wrong. An
injured individual is entitled to receive compensation for all demonstrable
losses proximately caused by the injury-past, present, and future. These
losses should include the cost of medical diagnostic services made neces-
sary by the injury.1 89
Logically, such recovery limitations are workable and fair only if
courts are willing to endorse mechanisms by which a plaintiff can recover
should the disease eventually manifest itself. One mechanism a number of
courts use is the split cause of action.19 Other alternatives include an in-
surance-based approach. 19' Limiting present recovery to emotional distress
184. See Kathleen A. O'Nan, The Challenge of Latent Physical Effects of Toxic Substances:
The Next Step in the Evolution of Toxic Torts, 7 J. MiN. L. & POL'y 227, 236-38 (1991-92)
(discussing reluctance of courts to recognize cause of action for enhanced risk).
185. See supra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. See generally Leslie S. Gara, Medical
Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers
Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARv. ENvm. L. Rv. 265, 268 (defining injury as the
invasion of an "interest in remaining free from toxin exposure of a type and level necessitating
medical surveillance"); Noel C. Birle, Note, Third Circuit Recognizes Medical Monitoring Tort
and Makes Significant Rulings Concerning Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases: In re Paoli
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation (1990), 37 VmL. L. Rzv. 1174, 1193 (1992) (discussing medical
monitoring tort as applied by court in Paoli); Slagel, supra note 162, at 684 (stating that the injury
sustained is the inability to avoid monitoring expenses).
187. In a toxic tort lawsuit involving multiple plaintiffs, one commentator recommends that a
fund be established to cover medical monitoring. Gara, supra note 186, at 284-85 (citing Habi-
tants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of New York, No. 84-S-3820 (C.P. York Co., Pa. Nov.
29, 1985)).
188. Brennan, supra note 180, at 67 (discussing medical monitoring recovery).
189. Kanner, supra note 24, at 348 (citing Porter v. Montgomery, 163 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1947); Cingota v. Milliken, 428 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); REsTATE mT (SECOND) O
ToRTs §§ 461, 910, 919 (1979)).
190. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text. According to this approach, the plaintiff
is permitted to sue at a later date should the disease occur.
191. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. Rv. 849, 919-24 (1984); Carson, supra note 183, at 652,
or a tax-supported compensation fund, Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts":
Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENvrI.. L.
REv. 177, 237-38 (1983). One author urges toxic tort reform through expansion of private first
party insurance. Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Di-
lemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 898-907 (1987).
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and medical monitoring while providing a remedy for subsequent disease,
produces a fair and equitable system that compensates plaintiffs for loss,
not chance.
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